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Introduction

High risk of a job loss has become a normal feature of labor markets in developed
economies, and many displaced workers have children. In the United States alone, it
is estimated that one out of nine children, or 8.1 million children in total, had at least
one unemployed parent during the most recent recession (Lovell and Isaacs, 2010). Similarly, 10 percent of all children in Europe between the ages of 0 and 17 live in households
with no employed person (Eurostat, 2018). It is well established that a job loss has uniformly negative effects on individuals, such as large reductions in income and earnings,
deteriorating health, and increasing risk of mortality.1 These consequences, however, are
not restricted to the displaced individuals alone, but are transmitted to their children
as well. Parental unemployment can decrease the well being and school performance of
children (e.g. Rege, Telle and Votruba (2011) and Powdthavee and Vernoit (2013)).
The analysis in this paper investigates how parents’ displacement might lead to
lower educational (human capital) investments in children. Unemployed parents might
not be able to optimally invest in their children’s human capital as a consequence of
lower income, diminished labor market prospects, and binding borrowing constraints.
Consequently, parental unemployment can lead to lower educational achievement, inferior
labor market outcomes, and lower lifetime earnings for their children. In turn, this could
translate into an increase in income inequality in the future. In this paper, I look at the
consequences of parental unemployment on the educational achievement of children and
the children’s long-run labor market outcomes in Austria. Obtaining causal estimates is,
however, difficult for at least four reasons.
First, parental unemployment might be correlated with the displaced parents’ decisions about investment in their children. Highly productive workers might have a
higher probability of holding higher-paying jobs and be employed by more successful
firms (Abowd, McKinney and Schmutte, 2017). Such circumstances shield these workers
from job loss and give them the opportunity to invest more in their children. This implies
that comparing children of unemployed parents to those whose parents did not experience
a job loss is likely to overstate the impact; see also Hilger (2016) and Fradkin, Panier and
Tojerow (2019).2
Second, even when one is able to find a suitable control group, the effect likely depends on the timing of the unemployment spell in a child’s life. On the one hand, parental
unemployment later in a child’s life cycle can have no effect or only marginal effects on
1

See, for example, Jacobsen, LaLonde and Sullivan (1993); Neal (1995); Stevens (1997); Hijzen, Upward
and Wright (2010); Couch and Placzek (2010); Schmidpeter (2018) for the impact on income and earnings,
and Sullivan and von Wachter (2009); Eliason and Storie (2009); Kuhn, Lalive and Zweimüller (2009);
Browning and Heinesen (2012) for the impact on health and mortality.
2
Another strategy is to use plant closures as a quasi experiment for unemployment. There is reasonable
doubt, however, that this strategy solves the sorting problem when comparing children of displaced
workers to those of nondisplaced workers.
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the child’s long-term outcome if most important investment decisions have already been
made. On the other hand, even short-term losses and constraints can affect parental
choices when the job loss happens around the time of crucial educational investment decisions. Pooling children of different ages together when estimating the effect of parental
unemployment can mask significant differences. Therefore, it is important to define the
timing of crucial educational investment during the life cycle of a child.
Third, measuring the impact of parental unemployment on children’s labor market
outcomes within a relatively short time period after the job loss or at a young age might
not properly reflect longterm impacts. It is possible that parental unemployment during
early childhood leads to lower investment in children, lower educational attainment, and,
as a consequence, to an earlier entry into the labor market by the child. Thus, using
outcomes measured early during the life cycle, one would compare children who have
relatively more labor market experience to those with less experience but higher education. This can lead to incorrect conclusions if the benefits of attending higher education
materialize later during the child’s working life.
Fourth, it is crucial for a well-defined policy debate to pin down potential channels
through which parental unemployment can affect children’s outcomes. This task is particularly difficult when the job loss happened relatively early in a child’s life cycle. The
total effect can be driven by changes in monetary-related investments in the child—for example, schooling choices. It can also be driven by nonmonetary-related investments, such
as time spent with the child. Even if parents as a response to unemployment spend more
time with their children, this adjustment can have larger or smaller effects, depending
on the child’s age when parents experience unemployment. These differences can occur
even within a relatively small age range.3 Hence, the estimated effect would not only
measure the incidence of different educational choices but also the different productivity
of parental inputs.
In this paper, I study the effect of parental unemployment happening around the
time of important human capital investment decisions for the child on the distribution
of long-term labor market outcomes. Using administrative data for Austria, I exploit
the tracking of children in the Austrian school system at age 10 and compare children
of parents who had an unemployment spell around the time of the track choice. The
early track choice constitutes an important educational investment decision in the life
of a child, as students are required to choose between a higher track, which emphasizes
more general education with the possibility to attend university, and a lower track, which
provides basic education and prepares students for vocational training. Which track is
3

For example, the baseline estimates in Del Bono, Francesconi, Kelly and Sacker (2016) indicate that
maternal educational time spent with the child at age three is almost three times as productive as
educational time spent at age five, while maternal recreational time spent with the child at a younger
age of the child is twice as productive.
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chosen depends on the parental decision and input, among other things. Parents who
choose the higher track for their child, which carries the possibility of entering university,
are more likely committed to financially supporting their children in the future, both
directly through payment of university costs and indirectly by supporting their children
during the time they delay entering the labor market. Facing these prospects, an income
shock around the time of the track choice can crucially affect the parental investment
decision.4
Experiencing unemployment will affect parents’ educational investment decisions by
affecting their ability to save and through their long-run expectations of their own lifetime
earnings. Specifically, those who experience a sudden unemployment spell may be more
likely to have more pessimistic views about future employment prospects and wages
(Kuchler and Zafar, 2018; Rabe and Schmidpeter, 2018). If unemployment insurance
systems such as those that are common in the United States and Austria do only replace
a small fraction of the displaced worker’s earnings, both of these effects—1) expectations
about employment stability and lifetime earnings and 2) the inability to save combined
with the need to dip into savings while unemployed—will come into play in parents’
educational investment decisions.5
It is also possible that a sudden unemployment spell at the timing of an educational
investment decision deters parents from choosing high-quality but also more expensive
schools. The costs considered by the parents when deciding which school to choose might
not only contain fees but likely depend on other factors, too. For example, areas with
high and improving school quality not only see an increase in student performance but
also experience higher house prices (e.g. Black, 1999; Gibbons and Machin, 2006; Kane,
Riegg and Staiger, 2006; Cellini, Fereirra and Rothstein, 2010; Fack and Grenet, 2010;
Hussain, 2017). Thus, even when families receive financial support for direct school costs
such as fees, a sudden income shock around an important educational decision can prevent
parents from moving to more expensive areas with higher school quality and reduce the
amount parents spend to help their children obtain their educational goals in other ways.
I find that an income shock as a result of parental unemployment shortly before the
child’s track choice significantly lowers a child’s likelihood of obtaining a university degree
compared to unemployment after the choice was made. An explanation for my finding is
the timing of an adverse income shock together with parents’ lower expectations about
4

There is no well-established student loan system available in Austria, and most students rely, at least
partly, on parental financing during their time of study. Parents are also required by law to support their
children financially for housing and food, among other expenses deemed necessary during university. In
Section 2, I provide an overview of the Austrian education system.
5
Austria’s unemployment insurance system is less generous than in most other European countries. The
benefit replacement rate is 55 percent of net earnings, but it is subject to a maximum and minimum
benefit level and other adjustments. Regardless of the personal circumstances, the maximum replacement
rate is capped at 80 percent of net earnings; see the discussion in Nekoei and Weber (2017) for more
details.
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future labor market outcomes leads to lower parental investment. I show that my results
are driven by children of parents with a lower predicted probability of recovering from
the unemployment shock.
I then investigate the long-term impacts of this suboptimal investment decision on
the long-term labor market outcomes of children. While I do not find any effect on annual
income at ages 29–31, my results indicate a gradual deterioration at the upper part of
the distribution later on. At ages 35–37 children between the 60th and 90th percentile
whose parents had an unemployment spell shortly before the educational track decision
earn between 1,500 and 3,500 euros (between $1,700 and $3,900) less per year. Under
the arguably strong assumption that these effects persist until the end of an individual’s
working life and approximate lifetime effects (Björklund, 1993; Böhlmark and Lindquist,
2006; Haider and Solon, 2006), and ignoring the impact on retirement benefits, my estimates imply at age 35 a net present value of lower future income of between 20,000 and
65,000 euros ($22,000 to $72,000). Applying a decomposition analysis, I find that up to
45 percent of these losses can be explained by lower educational achievement of these
children.
I also look at the effect on nonmonetary labor market outcomes, such as days employed and unemployed. I find that parental displacement at the time of a crucial educational decision induces individuals to work between 50 and 75 days more per year at
ages 29–31. This effect fades out later on: there is no significant impact on days worked
at ages 35–37. My estimation of days spent in unemployment reveals the opposite effect: early parental unemployment has no effect on children’s days spent in unemployment at a younger age, but increases them by around 50 days a year at ages 35–37 for
unemployment-prone individuals.
My findings show that parents do not necessarily behave in a (long-term) forwardlooking manner and that the timing of an adverse income shock can play an important
role in determining parental investment decisions. Parental unemployment at the time
of crucial educational decisions results in children being more likely to be tracked into
technical or vocational training, which requires fewer years of education. Children in
these tracks therefore enter the labor market earlier and have more time to accumulate
experience relative to children who attend university. This dampens the impact of lower
educational attainment on income during the early working life. As children with higher
education start to accumulate sufficient labor market experience, this trade-off weakens,
and the effect of parental unemployment at the time of the educational investment decision
starts to come into full effect.
My work contributes to the recent literature on the impact of parental unemployment on children’s labor market outcomes in several important ways. Similar as in Hilger
(2016) and Fradkin et al. (2019), I exploit the timing of the shock to identify the effect
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of parental unemployment on children’s outcomes. I use the existence of a crucial educational investment decision (track choice), however, to define the exact timing. Then, I
compare the outcome of children whose parents experienced unemployment at the time
the educational tracking decision was made (the treatment group) to the outcome of children whose parents experienced unemployment shortly after the tracking decision was
made (the control group).6 Under the assumption that children in both my treatment
and control groups are at the same development stage and exposed to the same shock
to family income, this allows me to capture the impact of a sudden drop in income
and constraints on crucial educational investment decisions. This is an important policy
parameter, which has not been explicitly accounted for in the existing literature (e.g.
Oreopoulos, Page and Huff Stevens, 2008; Hilger, 2016; Huttunen and Riukula, 2019).
With my data at hand, I am also able to evaluate the impacts of parental unemployment on children’s labor market outcomes up until the age of 37. This is longer
than in any previous work on this topic. For example, Hilger (2016) uses income at age
25, Huttunen and Riukula (2019) measure income at the year the child turns 30, and
Fradkin et al. (2019) use the quarterly income around the layoff for individuals aged 18
to 28. Oreopoulos et al. (2008) take a five-year earnings average when individuals in their
sample are between 25 and 33 years old. My results show that concentrating on younger
age groups can understate the long-term costs of unemployment.
I also concentrate on the distribution rather than mean effects, with the aim of
investigating potentially heterogeneous impacts of parental unemployment on children’s
outcomes. My findings indicate that parental investment affects children differently at
different parts of the outcome distribution. Understanding the distributional impact helps
identify vulnerable groups. This may be especially interesting for policymakers, as they
might be concerned about the impact of parental unemployment at certain parts of the
distribution.
This paper also contributes to the discussion on the impact of parental income,
wealth, and credit constraints during childhood on human capital investment and possible
long-term impacts. Income has become increasingly important in explaining investments
in children and their achievements.7 At the same time, binding borrowing constraints
can negatively affect children’s educational achievement—for example, when occurring

6

Fradkin et al. (2019) estimate the effect of parental unemployment around the time of labor market
entry, an age at which, arguably, most parental investment decisions have already been made.
7
Løken (2010); Milligan and Stabile (2011); Dahl and Lochner (2012); Løken, Mogstad and Wiswall (2012);
Jones, Milligan and Stabile (2015) find in general a positive effect of variations in family income on child
investment and achievement, using either an instrumental variable approach or parental displacement.
Carneiro and Ginja (2016) find that parental investments react to permanent but not to transitory income
shocks.
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at important times (e.g. Brown, Scholz and Seshadri, 2012, and Caucutt, Lochner and
Park, 2017).8
In this paper, I provide indirect evidence that not only does parental income per
se matter in explaining children’s achievements but also the timing and likely associated
(short-term) constraints matter. These channels are also highlighted in the model of
Caucutt and Lochner (2017). My results show that a drop in income at the time of an
important parental investment decision can negatively affect the educational attainment
of the child compared to situations in which the investment has already been made.
It should be emphasized that this paper neither intends nor is able to evaluate the
consequences of early tracking—as do, for example, Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) and
Dustmann, Puhani and Schönberg (2017). Hanushek and Wößmann (2006) find that early
tracking increases educational inequality; they compare outcomes between primary and
secondary school across different international systems. Dustmann et al. (2017) do not
find evidence in Germany that early tracking affects long-term outcomes. They attribute
this to the possibility of later track reversal facilitated by the German school system.
The difference between the German education system and the Austrian system studied
here is that the German education system offers three tracks: 1) a low track, 2) a middle
track, and 3) a higher track. This makes it easier for those attending the middle track to
revise their choice upward later on. The Austrian education system offered only a lower
and a higher track during the period studied here, making it comparably more difficult to
reverse the choice later on. In my work, I use the track choice as an important parental
decision in order to compare the consequences of parental unemployment on children at
similar development stages.
This paper proceeds by first describing the Austrian education system in the next
section. In Section 3, I describe the data and how I construct my treatment and control group. The impact of parental unemployment on family resources and children’s
educational attainment is discussed in Section 4. My empirical approach is outlined in
Section 5. Section 6 presents the main findings of the paper. In Section 7, I discuss underlying channels and present results from my decomposition analysis. Section 8 concludes.

8

Carneiro and Heckman (2002) do not find evidence that family borrowing constraints affect postsecondary
education using a simpler model than Brown et al. (2012). Bulman, Fairlie, Goodman and Isen (2016)
find only modest effects of changes in parental resources on college attendance for younger children
using lottery wins as an instrument, especially for low-SES households. They interpret their findings
as indicating that households do not face borrowing constraints. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2012)
provide an overview of the current literature on the impact of credit constraints on the accumulation of
human capital.
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2

The Austrian Education System

9

Compulsory schooling in Austria starts at age 6 and lasts until the age of 15. Enrollment
is based on a cutoff date. All children born before the first of September must enroll
by the age of six, while for children born after this date, enrollment is optional and
depends on their cognitive and noncognitive development.10 In addition, students might
be required to repeat a grade if test scores are not sufficiently high, but the likelihood of
grade retention is relatively low during primary school (grades one through four).11
An interesting feature of the Austrian education system is its early tracking of students at the end of primary school, which goes through grade four. At the end of grade
four—age 10 for most students—there are two types of compulsory education offered:
1) a general track which provides general education and concludes with a university entrance exam (Matura) and 2) a more specialized track which provides basic education
and prepares the student for vocational training and education. Admission to the general
track requires an average of at least “good” in the three core subjects of German writing,
reading, and mathematics. If these requirements are not met, students can sit for an
entrance qualification exam.12
In addition to a student’s school performance, track choice depends strongly on
the parents. Bruneforth, Weber and Bacher (2012) estimate that 60 to 70 percent of a
student’s likelihood of taking the higher, general track is influenced by the parents and
their socio-economic background. Hence, it is possible that even if a student meets all
objective requirements to attend the general track, parents may choose the specialized
one for their child. Around 30 to 35 percent of students choose the higher, general track
in grade five (Schneeweis and Zweimüller, 2014; Statistik Austria, 2018).
Early track choice might be reversed at grade nine, when students can revise their
first decision and choose to change from the specialist to the general track, given strong
school performance. Switching tracks in Austria occurs in only a minority of cases,
however: around 30 percent of students who chose the lower, specialized track at first
switch to the higher one which allows them to sit the university entrance exam (Matura)
(Schneeweis and Zweimüller, 2014; Statistik Austria, 2018). Around 80 percent of stu9

This section draws heavily on Schneeweis and Zweimüller (2014).
The official requirements are that the child has the capabilities of following and processing the material
taught during first grade. The assessment is conducted by the school, if necessary with help from trained
psychologists and physicians. It is also possible that attendance is postponed by one year if the student
is not deemed to have fulfilled the requirements.
11
The share of students who have to repeat a grade is in general low in Austria. On average, around 2
percent of students repeat grades two through four, 3 percent grades five through eight, and 4 percent of
students repeat grade nine (Schneeweis and Zweimüller, 2014). Recent statistics for the year 2015–2016
put the retention rate during primary school even as low as 0.6 percent (Statistik Austria, 2017).
12
In some cases, students might be admitted to the higher track even if the requirements are not entirely
met. For example, this is the case if the obtained grade in one of the three subjects is satisfactory and
the student shows in general a good performance in school.
10
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dents who switch from the specialized to the higher track attend higher vocational schools
which provide professional training and conclude with a university entrance qualification.
The remaining 20 percent attend higher general (academic) schools.13 Students attending
higher vocational schools have in general a substantially lower graduation rate compared
to students in higher general schools. Around 58 percent of students in higher vocational
schools graduate with a university entrance exam compared to 75 percent of students
attending higher general schools. Students who successfully graduate from higher vocational schools are also less likely to attend university. Only 55 percent of students from
higher vocational schools choose to study within 3 years after graduation compared to 85
percent of students graduating from higher general schools (Statistik Austria, 2017).
Students with Matura can enroll in a university or technical college (Fachhochschule).
Except for a small administration fee of 40 euros per year (roughly $45), attending university is free if the student graduates within a specified time period. This period is in
general set to four years for a bachelor’s degree and an additional three years to obtain a
master’s degree. Only around 50 percent of all students manage to graduate during this
specified time period, however. After exceeding these limits, students must pay university
fees of 766 euros ($850) a year.14 Fachhochschulen are independent in their decision to
charge fees up to a maximum of 728 euros ($812) per year, which is done by most schools.
Unlike in the United States or the United Kingdom, where school loans can be
used to cover room and board in addition to university registration fees, Austria does
not have an extensive student loan system. Students’ main sources of income while at
university are wages from (part-time) employment and parental support. In 2014, around
86 percent of students in Austria held a job, and around 50 percent of all students received
additional income support from their parents.15,16 Income from employment is, however,
relatively low, as 45 percent of employed students earned less than 400 euros per month,
and almost 70 percent earned less than 750 euros ($840) per month. In comparison, the
average monthly earnings of an individual aged 20 to 29 in Austria is 1,800 euros ($2,000).
Given the low earnings students make for working, a median duration of four years
to graduate with a bachelor’s degree, and an estimated lower bound of students’ living
expenses of 9,900 euros ($11,000) per year, support of students by their parents might
13

Both school types lead to a university entrance qualification. A student may find it easier to switch from
the specialized track to higher vocational schools. Attending a higher general school may require, besides
sufficiently good grades, that a student also passes additional entry exams if the respective subjects were
not or not as extensively taught in the lower track.
14
The median study duration is four years for a bachelor’s degree and almost three years for a master’s
degree (Statistik Austria, 2019a). Students outside the European Economic Area are in general subjected
to a maximum fee of around 1,490 euros per year regardless of the study duration.
15
These and the following figures were taken from the survey presented in Hajek, Kasper and Freidl (2014).
16
In an international comparison, the share of working students is relatively high. For example, in the
United States, around 43 percent of full-time undergraduate students worked in 2017, down from 50
percent in 2005 (McFarland, Hussar, Zhang, Wand, Wang, Hein, Diliberti, Forrest Cataldi, Bullock
Mann and Barmer, 2019).
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impose a nonnegligible financial burden on families.17 But even with income from work
and parental support, almost 60 percent of students state that the monthly amount they
receive is not sufficient to cover all costs (Hajek et al., 2014). Hence, besides facing
the prospects of continuous, regular financial support, parents are also the ones who
provide additional funding in case of emergencies. A sudden and long-lasting drop in
income at the time of the track choice can therefore deter parents from choosing the
higher general education track, which is more expensive. Unemployment can reduce
parents’ currently ability to save. It can also lead parents to adjust their expectations
about future employment and wages downward (Kuchler and Zafar, 2018; Rabe and
Schmidpeter, 2018). These factors, combined, may lower parents’ ability and willingness
to invest in their children’s current education. Parents might also try to limit their future
responsibilities by choosing the lower educational track, as they are required by law to pay
for their child’s maintenance during studies. I discuss this and alternative explanations
further in Section 6.
While deciding on the track choice at age 10 is common in Austria and Germany,
similar crucial educational investment decisions exist in other countries.18 In most OECD
countries, tracking of students is common by the age of 16, when parents and students
need to choose the educational track they will follow (OECD, 2004). In addition, mirroring the setting in Austria, most European countries either do not have a well-established
student loan system, or additional financial support from parents is likely necessary to
study.19 Thus, similarly as in Austria, a sudden income shock at the track choice can affect the parental decision when facing the possibility of committing to prolonged financial
support in the future.

3

Data and Selection Process

The analysis is based on two different data sets: the Austrian Social Security Database
(ASSD) and the Register for Family Allowances. The ASSD is a matched firm-worker
17

The costs of living were taken from the recommendations of the Business University of
Vienna,
https://www.wu.ac.at/studium/services-fuer-studieninteressierte/master/
internationale-studierende/allgemeines-leben-in-wien/lebenshaltungskosten/
18
There are several other European countries with relative early tracking. For example, the Czech Republic
and Hungary track at age 11, and Belgium and the Netherlands track at around age 12 (OECD, 2004).
19
Grant and loan systems differ substantially by country.
For example, students in the
Netherlands can borrow up to 800 euros per month, excluding tuition fees.
The exact amount depends on parental income and their own employment situation, and some students might not be eligible at all (https://duo.nl/particulier/student-finance/amounts.
jsp).
Germany has a more complex grant and loan system, and eligibility depends on numerous criteria. Loans, which are available to all students regardless of parental income (Bildungskredit), only allow students to borrow up to 7,200 euros, which is likely not enough
to cover all costs (https://www.bva.bund.de/DE/Services/Buerger/Schule-Ausbildung-Studium/
Bildungskredit/Antrag/Bildungskredit-Hintergrund/bildungskredit-was-bietet_node.html).
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database covering all private sector workers in Austria. It contains detailed information
about demographic characteristics, daily labor market states, and yearly earnings until
the end of 2016. Zweimüller, Winter-Ebmer, Lalive, Kuhn, Wuellrich, Ruf and Büchi
(2009) provide an extensive description of the ASSD.
The Register for Family Allowances contains information about child benefit payments, the person who is granted the benefits, and the child for whom the benefits are
paid. Furthermore, in case a spouse is indicated at application, information on her/him
is supplied. This enables me to link parents with children. The unique person identifier,
available in all data sets, allows me to link parents and children to their work history and
demographic characteristics.
Unfortunately, the data contain only information about the qualification received
and do not allow me to track the different educational institutions an individual has
attended, or individual school performance. The numbers presented in the previous
section, however, suggest that school choice at age 10 is closely correlated to the final
degree a person received. Therefore, the final degree obtained constitutes a good proxy
for parental educational investment decisions made at age 10 of the child.

3.1

Treatment and Control Groups

From the combined data, I first select all parents who had at least one child born between
1975 and 1979. This selection enables me to follow children of unemployed parents until
the age of 37, an age at which individuals are fairly well established in the labor market
and observed effects are a good approximation for the impact on lifetime outcomes. I
then select all families in which the main earner in the family had an unemployment
spell between 1987 and 1989. The main earner is defined as the person, either mother or
father, with the highest average income over the three years prior to the year of interest.
From the obtained sample, I select all families with at least one child aged 10 or 12
at the time of the parent’s unemployment. I exclude children who were 11 years old at
the time of the parental unemployment spell to overcome potential problems with grade
retention or repetition at the time of the track choice or late school enrollment.20 In order
to account for the schooling entry cutoff in a given year, I also exclude all children born
after the first of September from my analysis. This is to minimize ambiguity in the age
at which the track choice was made for children born after September 1.
From this sample, I drop all families in which the main earner had less than 360
employment days in the year prior to the unemployment spell. Requiring a minimum
labor market attachment of the main earner allows me to capture a sudden drop in family
20

Students at age 11 do not make up a “pure” control group. Extending the age range at the time of
parental unemployment delivers qualitatively similar results as those presented here. The results for the
extended control group can be found in the Appendix.
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income as a result of unemployment and is common in the literature that studies the
effects of unemployment (e.g. Jacobsen et al. (1993)). Applying all restrictions, my final
sample consists of 3,767 children.21 Children whose parents had an unemployment spell
at the time of the track choice—that is, at the time the child was 10—are considered as
treated, while children whose parents had an unemployment spell at age 12 are considered
as controls.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for my estimation sample by treatment status.
In general, the difference in parental characteristics between treatment and control group
are very small. Main earners in both groups have similar average labor market experience
and earnings. Parents in my treatment group tend to have slightly younger spouses at
birth of the study child and are also more likely to be employed in the construction and
tourism sector before the reference year. Although the years 1987 to 1989 were marked
by stable economic conditions, the observed differences might be the result of different
sectoral shocks in the economy. To account for this, I control not only for sector but also
for year effects in my analysis.
[ Table 1 ]

3.2

Long-Term Child Outcomes

My outcomes of interest are children’s yearly days of employment and unemployment, as
well as their annual income. In order to derive policy implications, it is important to evaluate the effect of parental unemployment over a long time period. As pointed out above,
previous studies examining outcomes early in a child’s life cycle certainly are important.
But focusing only on early outcomes can fail to reveal long-term consequences. This
study examines both short-term and long-term outcomes and illustrates the importance
of examining both.
I measure all the outcomes of interest when the children are older—between the ages
of 29 and 37. The lower age bound is chosen to allow for sufficient time for students to
finish higher education. Although this threshold is somewhat arbitrary, the difference in
the labor force participation rate between university graduates and nongraduates before
age 29 is substantial. At age 20, regardless of whether children are in my treatment or
control group, I observe a 28 percentage point lower labor force participation rate for
university graduates compared to nongraduates in my data. A comparable difference
remains until children reach the age of 29.22 At the upper bound at age 37, individuals
21

The estimation results that do not require any labor market attachment before the unemployment spells
are very similar to the ones presented here and can be found in the Appendix.
22
In the Appendix, I provide estimates for outcomes before age 29.
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are fairly well established in the labor market. I divide my data into three-year intervals
and average the outcomes within these intervals. This allows me to capture labor market
performances at three different points in a child’s life cycle. Outcomes at ages 29–31 can
be thought of as an early stage, in which individuals are still not well established in the
labor market, especially for individuals who attend university. At ages 32–34, individuals
normally have obtained a sufficient amount of labor market experience and are probably
in their career jobs. It is likely that the impact of parental unemployment will start to
materialize when individuals reach this age. Differences observed between the treatment
and control groups at ages 35-37 might be good approximations for differences in lifetime
earnings and attachment to the labor market (Björklund, 1993; Böhlmark and Lindquist,
2006; Haider and Solon, 2006). Hence, effects found at this age range may persist until
the end of people’s working lives.23
The lower part of Table 1 contains summary statistics for long-term wages and educational attainment of children in my sample. I do not find any statistically significant
differences in mean log average earnings at ages 35–37, but this measure masks important
differences later in life. Looking at the distribution, I find that children in my treatment
group have in general lower income along the entire distribution, but that the effect of
early parental unemployment is more pronounced at the upper part of the distribution.
For example, at the 70th and 90th percentiles, I estimate significant differences of 7 log
points. There are also large differences in the probability of having long-term unemployment spells. For example, children in my treatment group have a 2.5 percentage point
higher likelihood of having at least a 90-day unemployment spell over the three-year
period. These estimates indicate that parental unemployment at important educational
decision points for their children could contribute to long-term earnings inequality in their
children’s generation.
What also is striking is the difference in educational attainment of children by treatment status. Children whose parents were displaced at the time of their track choice have
around a 5 percentage point lower probability of obtaining a university degree, and this
difference is statistically significant at a 1% level.24 Having higher levels of education is
arguably more important at the upper end of the wage distribution. These unadjusted
results for labor market outcomes and educational attainment indicate that parental unemployment at a time of important educational decisions could contribute to long-term
earnings inequality in the next generation and long-term effects on the parents’ children.

23

The effects are more pronounced using a two-year average of the outcomes and show a even clearer
deterioration in the labor market performance with age. Detailed estimates can be found in the Appendix.
24
Although the Austrian educational system distinguishes between numerous types of higher education institutions, such as universities and Fachhochschulen, I refer to degrees from higher education institutions
collectively as “university degrees” in the following paragraphs.
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4

Parental Unemployment, Family Income, and Children’s Educational Attainment

4.1

Impact on Family Income

My main hypothesis is that parental unemployment at the time of important parental educational decisions, not only income loss per se, is an important determinant in explaining
differences in children’s long-term outcomes. I first investigate the effect of unemployment on family income in order to establish that families do suffer a loss of income when
a parent becomes unemployed. If the timing of the income shock, and not only the drop
in income, is an important determinant of observing differences in children’s educational
achievement, I should not find any differences in the income paths between parents in my
treatment group and those in my control group.
I evaluate the impact of an unemployment spell on yearly log parental income ω
from three years prior until five years after the unemployment spell of a parent in the
family by calculating the counterfactuals E[ω(1)] and E[ω(0)]. Under unconfoundedness
and sufficient overlap in the outcome between the treatment and control groups, these
quantities can be obtained by separate linear regression in the two subpopulations, with
T = 1 (a parent in the family experiences unemployment at the time of the educational
decision point for the child) and T = 0 (a parent in the family experiences unemployment
after the time of the educational decision for the child). Figure 1 plots the estimates
together with 95% confidence intervals: Panel A depicts the income path for the main
earner of the household, and Panel B the path of total family income—the yearly income
of the main earner and the spouse.
[ Figure 1 ]
Figure 1 reveals two striking features. First, an unemployment spell is associated
with a sharp fall in both individual and family income by around 35 log points at the year
of the unemployment spell. Both family and individual income slowly recover over the
following years, but even after four years income lies still below preunemployment levels
on average. The small differences between both measures and their similar paths show
that spouses in both groups react only weakly to unemployment of the main earner; see
also, for example, Blundell, Pistaferri and Saporta-Eksten (2016), Halla, Schmieder and
Weber (2018), and Haan and Prowse (2019) for recent work on this topic.
Second, the estimated counterfactual differences in the income paths between those
parents who experienced unemployment at the educational decision time and those who
experienced unemployment after the decision time are small and statistically insignificant.
Hence, children in both my treatment and my control groups are likely confronted with
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the same effect on family resources. Therefore, a more severe or differential drop in income
between those two groups alone is unlikely to explain the observed differences in children’s
educational achievement. It is more likely that the short-term financial constraints caused
by unemployment at the time of the parental educational investment decision, lower
expectations about future employment of the parents, and the prospects of future support
payments if the child attends university, all lead parents in my treatment group to choose
the lower educational track. In addition, the virtually nonexistent difference in income
between the two groups supports my identification strategy and shows that children in
both my treatment group and my control group likely have the same access to resources
before and after the parental unemployment spell.

4.2

Impact on Children’s Educational Attainment

Having established that families in both my treatment and my control groups face similar
income constraints, I investigate how parental unemployment around the time of the track
choice affects the educational achievement of children. I estimate the average treatment
effect of having obtained a university degree similarly to the way in which the income
effects were estimated in the previous section; however, I now use a logit outcome model.
The results are presented in Table 2 together with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals.
[ Table 2 ]
The first row of Table 2 shows the estimation results for my total sample. Parental
displacement at the time of the educational track choice compared to a later time lowers
the child’s probability of obtaining a university degree from around 30% to 25%, which
corresponds to a treatment effect of around 5 percentage points.25 This estimate is close
to the observed raw differences of 5.84 percentage points reported in Table 1 when not
controlling for any covariates. The similar results give reassurance in my identification
strategy. Including covariates in my analysis only marginally lowers the estimated treatment effect.
One explanation for my finding is that unemployed parents adjust their expectations
about their future reemployment probabilities and labor market outcomes downward and
therefore also lower their current investments. For example, Kuchler and Zafar (2018)
show that personal unemployment experiences lead to an overly pessimistic view about
future unemployment rates. Related to the finding in Kuchler and Zafar (2018), Rabe
25

Coelli (2011) finds that parental job loss when the child is aged 16–18 lowers the probability of the
child’s enrolling in postsecondary education by around 10 percentage points, using data for Canada. He
compares the outcome of children whose parents were displaced to the outcome of children whose parents
did not lose their jobs. As argued above, this might introduce bias in the estimation and can overstate
the impact of parental unemployment.
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and Schmidpeter (2018) show that unexpected and negative changes to individuals’ information sets can drastically lower expectations about their future financial situation.
Parents might also try to limit their future responsibilities by choosing the lower educational track, as they are required by law to pay for their child’s maintenance during
studies.26 Overall, facing the possibilities of providing support to their children for a
prolonged period of time, coupled with likely lower expectations about future job possibilities, can lead parents to choose the lower educational track, even though the actual
decision to attend university still lies far ahead.
The next rows present the estimation results for four different subsamples chosen
in such a way that the estimates should be a proxy for different magnitudes of credit
constraints, family resources, and shocks to parental labor market careers. I first consider
families in which a spouse was present. These families might be more flexible in coping
with unemployment of the main earner, for example, by increasing the labor supply of
the spouse. Parental investment might also be higher when both parents are present.
Second, I investigate the effect on children in single-parent households (Single).
These children are likely the most constrained in terms of future available family resources.27
Third, I consider the effect on families in which the main parent is eligible for
benefit duration of 30 weeks, or roughly 7.5 months. Eligibility for 30 weeks constitutes
an extension of 10 weeks over the usual benefit duration of 20 weeks. An individual is
eligible for the extension if, during the three years preceding the current unemployment
spell, the person did not claim benefits for more than 20 weeks and was employed for
at least 152 weeks. Because these parents have had more stable employment in the
past, families in this group should be less credit constrained. Furthermore, given the
longer time parents are eligible for benefits, they might be more selective during the job
search, searching for jobs that have higher wages, that provide better promotion potential,
that offer more job stability, or that better utilize their skills (Nekoei and Weber, 2017,
for example,). Obtaining higher-paying and more stable jobs might lower the parents’
concerns about providing future support payments to the child when that child attends
university.
Fourth, I also differentiate by parental preunemployment average income. Similar to
individuals with longer benefit eligibility, parents with higher preunemployment earnings
might have more resources to smooth the sudden shock. They might also have more
resources to look for better reemployment and higher wages. Correspondingly, families
26

By law, the maintenance payment can be quite substantial, up to 22% of the net yearly income of the
person liable for maintenance. To avoid excessive maintenance payment, the maximum monthly amount
is capped at 1,450 euros. The exact amount payable depends on numerous factors, such as the number
and age of maintenance-eligible children and their income.
27
I define all households as single-parent households if no spouse was indicated during application for
child-care benefits.
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with lower preunemployment income might have fewer possibilities to adjust to the shock.
I consider all children as coming from lower-income families if the average yearly wage
of the main earner three years prior to the unemployment spell does not exceed 18,000
euros. In contrast, children of families with an average yearly income of at least 30,000
euros per year are considered high-income families.28
One striking feature of my estimations for the two-parent and single-parent samples,
reported in the second and third rows of Table 2, is the estimated likelihood of holding
a university degree under both treatment and control groups compared to the entire
sample. Children of two-parent families are in general more likely to obtain a university
degree regardless of whether they are in the the treatment group or the control group.
However, children in two-parent households with a parent experiencing an unemployment
spell before the track choice are still less likely to receive a university degree than children
whose parent had an unemployment spell after the track choice was made. Similarly, the
estimates for the single-parent sample indicate that the probability of holding a university
degree is only 19% when the parent had an early unemployment spell at the educational
decision point and around 24% when the unemployment spell occurred after the child’s
track choice.29
The results for those children whose parents experienced a spell of unemployment
at the educational decision point likely reflect lower family resources. In turn, these
tighter financial constraints likely lead to a lower probability of these children attending
university. For two-parent families and single-parent families, I estimate a treatment
effect of –5.03 percentage points and –4.49 percentage points, respectively. Both of these
estimates are very similar to the ones obtained from my entire sample. These results
show that although the propensity to obtain a university degree differs whether a second
parent is present or not, both types of families react in a similar way to an unemployment
spell at the track choice.
My results are also similar to my estimates using the entire sample when concentrating on the extended benefit sample (row four) or when differentiating by preunemployment
parental income (rows five and six). The similarity in size of the treatment effect across
different sample specifications implies hat the timing of an adverse income shock together
with lower expectations about future labor market outcomes can play an important role
in determining parental investment decisions.

28

It also would be interesting to see how parental contributions toward students’ finances are correlated
with parental income, as in Hilger (2016). Unfortunately, my data does not contain any information
about transfers from the parents to the student.
29
I also investigate how results are affected when restricting the sample to individuals with preunemployment firm tenure of at least three years. For these individuals job loss may occur arguably unanticipated.
They may also be less inclined to change their labor market career as a response to children’s early school
performance. The obtained results are similar to the ones for high parental preunemployment income.
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To explore this hypothesis further, I form a prediction of the probability that the
main earner attains the preunemployment income level within five years after the unemployment spell. To avoid overfitting when predicting the probabilities, I apply the
method suggested in Abadie, Chingos and West (2018). Then, I split the sample into
two groups of parents with above and below median predicted probabilities of reaching
preunemployment income level. The results, presented in Appendix B, show that the
lower educational attainment of children in my treatment group is driven by those of
parents with lower predicted probability of recovering from the unemployment shock over
an extended time period.
In sum, the estimates support my hypothesis that a sudden income shock coupled
with lower expectations about the future can reduce parental commitment and lower
investment. They also show that parents do not necessarily behave in a (long-term)
forward-looking manner.
One concern is that my estimates are picking up something else in my data and do
not reflect the effect of parental unemployment around times of important educational
decisions. To investigate this possibility, I estimate the impact of parental unemployment
for a significant period of time before the actual track choices are made. Specifically,
children whose parents experience an unemployment spell when the children first enroll
in school at age six are considered to be in the treatment group, whereas children whose
parents had an unemployment spell before school enrollment, when the children were
four, are considered to be in the control group.30
The last row of Table 2 presents the estimation results for this sample. Parental
unemployment when the child starts school has a very small negative and insignificant
effect on the child’s obtaining a university degree. This result supports my hypothesis
that parental unemployment at an important educational decision milestone, rather than
parental unemployment per se, can explain the negative impact on children’s educational
attainment that I estimated.
A confounding factor for my findings might be that children of unemployed parents do not achieve the required grade point average in order to advance to the general
education track. For example, Rege et al. (2011) show that parental displacement has
a negative effect on children’s school performance using data for Norway, while Gregg,
Macmillan and Nasim (2012) find a negative impact of parents’ displacement on grades
of children in the United Kingdom. One explanation for this relationship might be lower
financial resources to spend on tutoring or other educational material for children. An-

30

The results for this group are not sensitive if children aged four or aged five are used in the control
group. Arguably, parental investment at age five and age six should have more similar effects compared
to age four, but to remain consistent with my main specification I chose a two-year difference between
treatment and control groups.

18

other explanation might be that distress caused by unemployment leads to lower parental
investment in general.
While I cannot test and rule out this explanation with my data, I argue that the
results in Table 2 do not point toward it as the sole explanation. First, if the negative
relationship between parental unemployment and children’s GPAs is driven only by lower
financial resources, then one would expect that children of less constrained families would
be better able to cope with the negative impact of parental unemployment and to achieve
higher educational attainment, with the possibility to reverse the track choice later on.31
Hence, one would expect a substantially lower treatment effect for this group compared
to more constrained families. My results in Table 2 do not show any large difference
in educational attainment between children of constrained and unconstrained families,
however.
Second, if mental distress is the sole factor in explaining the differences in children’s
GPAs, and in turn the lower likelihood of their attending university, then one would likely
expect the effects to be stronger for single-parent families compared to two-parent families. Single parents might not readily have a partner or social interactions available, two
important factors to deal with high levels of stress (e.g. Schmidpeter, 2019). Therefore,
one would expect larger effects for children of single-parent families. Again, my results
in Table 2 do not indicate that this is the case.
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, the track admission process offers some
flexibility to teachers. Students can attend the higher, general track even if the requirements are not entirely met. This is the case if students showed in general good performance at school and admission to the higher track is supported by the teacher. Thus,
students may be able to attend the higher track even when their GPAs fall shortly before
the track choice. In addition, the track choice also depends strongly on the decision of
the parents. Around 60% of a student’s probability of taking the higher, general track
is explained by parents and their socio-economic background, even after adjusting for
students’ grades and other characteristics (Bruneforth et al., 2012); see the discussion in
Section 2.

5

Quantile Treatment Effects

The summary statistics presented in Section 3 suggest that it is important to look at the
effect of parental unemployment along the outcome distributions. As some of my labor
market outcomes of interests are discrete, such as employment and unemployment days,
applying the standard quantile regression approach is not a valid strategy. Instead, I
31

As already mentioned in the introduction, numerous papers such as Løken (2010); Milligan and Stabile
(2011); Dahl and Lochner (2012); Løken et al. (2012); Jones et al. (2015) in general find a positive effect
of income on children’s achievement.

19

will make use of the so-called distribution regression (Foresi and Peracchi, 1995; Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val and Melly, 2013). This flexible approach enables me to model
any type of outcome, such as discrete, continuous, and mixed, and allows the covariates to have a different impact on the outcome at different points of the distribution.
This idea, along with further developments, has been used in numerous studies in recent years. For example, Callaway and Huang (2018) evaluate intergenerational income
mobility, Kolodziej and Garcia-Gomez (2017) retirement on mental health, and Delgado,
Garcia-Suarez and Sant’Anna (2017) the effect of unemployment insurance benefits on
unemployment duration. In the following paragraphs, I explain my estimation procedure
in more detail.
The parameter of interest is the quantile treatment effect (QTE), which allows me
to obtain the effect of parental unemployment at crucial stages on the distribution of
long-term child outcomes. Let Y be the outcome of interest and T denote the treatment
indicator, with T = 1 for parental unemployment at the important education decision
(track choice). For some τ ∈ (0, 1), the QTE can be formally defined as
∆(τ ) = Q1 (τ ) − Q0 (τ )

(1)

where Qt (τ ) is the counterfactual quantile defined as inf{y : Ft (y) ≥ τ } for t ∈ {0, 1}. Assuming unconfoundedness and overlap (see, for example, Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)),
each counterfactual outcome in Equation (1) can be derived from a corresponding distribution function. I do so by proceeding in two steps. First, I estimate the counterfactual
distribution Ft (y) as
N
1 Xb
b
FY |X,T =t (y|t, Xi )
Ft (y) =
N i=1

(2)

0
In my estimation, I parameterize FY |X,T =t (y|t, Xi ) = Λ(Xi,T
=t β(y)), where Λ(•) is the logistic function and Xi,T =t are the observed covariates for group T = t. Hence, FbY |XT =t (y|t, Xi )
is estimated by separate logistic regression in the subpopulation with T = 1 and T = 0. In
order to avoid having my results depend on the chosen grid of thresholds y, I estimate (2)
for every observed outcome value.
c1 (y) and F
c0 (y) to obtain the quantities necessary to
In a second step, I invert F

calculate ∆(τ ). Inference is based on the Bayesian bootstrap, with 999 replications taking
clustering on the family level into account (Chernozhukov, Fernandez-Val, Melly and
Wüthrich, 2017).32

32

Compared to the nonparametric bootstrap, the Bayesian bootstrap is better at dealing with small cell
sizes; see also Chernozhukov et al. (2017).
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6

Parental Unemployment and Children’s Long-Term
Labor Market Outcomes

6.1

Impact on Children’s Long-Term Labor Market Outcomes

In this section, I present my main estimates of the effects of parental unemployment on
children’s long-term labor market outcomes. Looking at the entire distributional impact
will help to uncover potential heterogeneity in the impact, which would be masked by
concentrating just on mean effects. The main results are presented in Figure 2.
[ Figure 2 ]
Effect on Days of Employment: The first row of Figure 2 presents the impact
of parental unemployment at the track choice on the distribution of average yearly employment days for my three age groups, reflecting three different career stages together
with 90% confidence intervals.33 Interestingly, I find that parental unemployment affects
employment days only for individuals between the 15th and 65th percentiles, while the
rest of the distribution is unaffected.34 These individuals can be considered as being
rather loosely attached to the labor market.
The effect is strong and significant during the early career stage between the 20th
and the 40th percentiles. The average yearly increases in days worked is between 22
and 42 days. As can be seen from the figure, this effect slowly fades out as children
establish themselves in the labor market. At ages 32 to 34, parental unemployment
at the track choice is associated with an 8-to-38-day increase in average employment
days between the 20th and the 40th percentiles. The estimates are only significantly
different from zero at the lower percentiles, however. At ages 34–37, the estimated effect
is substantially smaller compared to earlier stages in children’s postschool work life and
are not statistically different from zero.
The results presented here extend the findings of Fradkin et al. (2019). They find
that parental unemployment shortly before the end date of a child’s full-time education
increases children’s days worked over the next three years compared to children whose
parents lost their jobs shortly after the end of the child’s full-time education, but the effect
disappears within the next four years. My results show that parental unemployment at
crucial educational decision points for children increases the labor supply of these children
among those who are loosely attached to the labor market at the beginning of their
33

Remember that I use the ages 29–31 to define an early stage in an individual’s labor market career and
ages 32–34 the stage at which individuals most likely are in their career jobs. At ages 35–37, my results
are a good approximation for lifetime effects; see 3.
34
The treatment effect below the 15th and above the 65th percentiles is always estimated to be 0 and
therefore not depicted in the graph.
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careers. My results indicate that this effect is due to children whose parents experienced
unemployment close to a crucial educational decision point likely being pushed into more
vocationally oriented education and training, leading to an earlier start in the labor
market. As individuals with higher levels of education start to establish themselves in
the labor market, these early differences slowly disappear.
Effect on Days of Unemployment: Another interesting outcome is the distributional effect of children’s average days spent in unemployment. The second row of
Figure 2 plots the estimated treatment effect together with 90% confidence intervals for
the three specific age ranges.35 The results reveal two interesting points. First, the
estimated treatment effect exhibits substantial heterogeneity along the distribution of
unemployment days. It is concentrated in the upper part, also among children with more
unemployment days. Parental unemployment at the track choice transmits itself to children by causing these children to experience more unemployment themselves. Second,
my results indicate an increasing effect over a child’s working life. At ages 29–31, my
estimates are largely insignificant and small over most parts of the unemployment days
distribution, the exception being after the 90th percentile. At older ages, the treatment
effect increases almost monotonically as the quartile cutoffs increase. At the age at which
children of parents who suffered an unemployment event close to the time of educational
decisions are established in the labor market, ages 35–37, my estimates show a strong
and significant treatment effect on the number of days they are unemployed. Around the
80th percentile, parental displacement at the track choice is associated with a significant
increase of 12 days; at the 95th percentile, there is a significant increase of 50 days for
those aged 35–37.
Oreopoulos et al. (2008) find that children of displaced fathers have a higher likelihood of receiving unemployment benefits later in life. In their analysis, Oreopoulos
et al. (2008) use firm closures to instrument for father’s unemployment. As pointed
out by Hilger (2016) and discussed in the introduction, one concern is that the results
might be partially driven by selection of fathers into firms that close. I show that even
when accounting for potential selection into firms that close, experiencing a parental
unemployment spell around important educational decision points can have long-lasting
consequences for children. My results indicate that the unemployment effects are largely
concentrated among children more prone to becoming unemployed themselves.
Effect on Income: The last row in Figure 2 presents the estimation results using
average yearly wages as the outcome. Parental unemployment at the time of the child’s
track choice has no effect on average income at the beginning of the child’s labor market
career (when children are ages 29–31). The estimates are rather small and not statistically
significant. As shown in Section 4, my treatment leads to a lower probability of children
35

The treatment effect below the 60th percentile is always estimated to be 0 and therefore is not depicted
in the graph.
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obtaining a university degree, and therefore I am likely comparing lower-educated children
with relatively more labor market experience to children with higher educational attainment but relatively less labor market experience at this age range. In the Appendix, I
provide additional evidence of this interpretation and show that parental unemployment
at the track choice has a positive effect on income at the ages of 20 to 23, a time of life
when most university students have only a loose labor market attachment but those with
lower levels of education will be more firmly attached to the labor market.
The negative effects of parental unemployment at important educational milestones
for their children becomes noticeable when looking at the income when the children are
ages 32–34. At this age, regardless of their educational attainment, all of the children
should be relatively well established in the labor market. For this age group, one can
observe an almost uniform downward shift in income along the distribution. From the
median onward, the drop in income for the treatment group is particularly large. In
the upper half of the distribution, having an unemployed parent shortly before the track
choice compared to afterward is associated with an average annual income loss of between
1,000 and 3,000 euros ($1,200 to $ 3,500), or a drop of roughly 6%. The considerable
impact of parental unemployment at the track choice can also be seen when comparing
the income loss to the average annual income of 31,000 euros for workers in the age range
between 30 and 39 years.
Looking at the estimated treatment effect at ages 35–37, one can see that the magnitude of the income loss is amplified for the greater part of the distribution above the
median. For example, my estimates suggest an average yearly income loss, at ages 32–34,
of 1,600 euros ($1,800) compared to 1,100 euros ($1,200) around the 60th percentile; of
2,600 euros ($2,900) compared to 900 euros ($1,000) around the 80th percentile; and of
3,500 euros ($3,900) compared to 3,000 euros around the 90th percentile. As a university
degree is arguably more valuable at higher wages, my results imply that lower educational
attainment can have long-lasting consequences for children with higher income. Under
the arguably strong assumption that my estimates at ages 35–37 reflect lifetime effects
(Björklund, 1993; Böhlmark and Lindquist, 2006; Haider and Solon, 2006) and persist
until the end of the child’s working life, and assuming an individual retires at the age
of 60 years, parental unemployment at times of important educational decisions reduces
the net present value of children’s future income at age 35 by between 20,000 and 65,000
euros (or between $22,000 and $72,000). This simple calculation ignores the impact on
retirement benefits as a consequence of lower labor income and is therefore likely a lower
bound for the true effect.36 My results also indicate that there is no persistent effect
36

The calculation is based on the assumption that the estimated income losses persist until the age of 60
and the individual retires thereafter. It is also assumed that retirement benefits are not affected by lower
income. As the calculation of retirement benefits is based on the best years of an individual’s working
life, my calculation likely understates the impact of parental unemployment. The yearly discount rate
was set to 3%.
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for individuals below the median with an insignificantly estimated treatment effect close
to 0. The observed strong heterogeneity along the income distribution highlights the
importance of considering statistics beyond the mean.
While only roughly comparable, my estimates of the long-run effects of parental
unemployment on income at the upper part of the distribution are lower than the mean
effects found by Oreopoulos et al. (2008), but higher compared to those in Huttunen and
Riukula (2019). Oreopoulos et al. (2008) find that paternal displacement in the United
States decreases age-adjusted income by around 9%, while my results indicate a loss of
around 6% to 7% at ages 35–37 for children in the upper half of the distribution, and no
effect for those in the lower half. Using administrative data for Finland and involuntary
job displacement as treatment, Huttunen and Riukula (2019) find a negative impact of
around 600 euros on annual earnings measured at age 30. Using a modified differencein-difference strategy to estimate the effect of parental unemployment, Hilger (2016) and
Fradkin et al. (2019) do find very small effects on log earnings and salary.37
The different outcomes in previous studies might reflect the different identification
strategies and as a result the different implications of the estimated results. In my analysis, I exploit the timing of the parental unemployment shock and identify the importance
of constraints at important educational decision points on children’s educational attainment and future labor market outcomes. My identification exposes children to the same
experience and to a similar impact on family income during childhood, and it avoids
inherent biases that may be embodied in the comparison of children of displaced versus
nondisplaced parents. For example, Kramarz and Skans (2014) show that many children
find their first job in their parents’ establishments. Children benefit from the parental
network by having better labor market outcomes and higher wages a few years after labor
market entry. Parental unemployment weakens these network effects, however (Huttunen
and Riukula, 2019). Under my identification assumption, children in both the treatment
and control groups should be exposed to the same environment. Hence, my results on
the impact of parental unemployment are net of these effects.38
An alternative explanation for my findings might be that adverse economic conditions when individuals start their labor market career can explain the estimated wage
loss I observe. As children whose parents experience unemployment at the time of important educational decisions are encouraged to follow a track that involves fewer years of
schooling, these students enter the labor market at a different time and perhaps under different economic conditions compared to children in my control group. Previous research
has shown that, especially among college graduates, the circumstance of first becoming
37

Hilger (2016) also emphasizes the role of parental selection into closing firms and shows that ignoring
this issue can lead to severely biased estimates.
38
This argument does not hold if the timing of the unemployment spell affects the network of parents
differently. The results reported in Huttunen and Riukula (2019) do not indicate that this is the case.
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unemployed during an economic downturn leads to lower lifetime earnings and inferior
employment (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz, 2012; Altonji, Kahn and
Speer, 2016). In contrast, lower-skilled individuals seem to be less affected by initial labor
market conditions, and what effect there is, is less persistent (Genda, Kondo and Ohta,
2010; Cockx and Ghirelli, 2016; Speer, 2016).
The years during which I measure my long-term outcomes, however, were marked by
stable economic growth.39 In addition, my results indicate that parental unemployment
close to important educational decisions for their children leads to lower educational
achievement and income losses in the long run for children, although I do not find any
significant differences at the beginning of the labor market career for these children. I also
find that days of employment are higher for individuals in my treatment group, contrary
to the findings in the literature on initial conditions.40 Overall, initial conditions are
unlikely to explain my results.
The results in this section show a negative impact of parental unemployment at their
children’s important educational milestones on the long-term labor market outcomes of
these children. Looking at the distributional effect rather than just the mean reveals substantial heterogeneity. Unemployment-prone children and those at the upper half of the
income distribution are particularly affected in the long run. I do not find any significant
effects at the beginning of their labor market careers, however. One explanation for the
differential impact early and late in these children’s careers is that the impact of lower
educational achievement is partially dampened by an increase in labor market experience at the beginning of the careers of children in my treatment group. The children in
the treatment group were encouraged to pursue lower levels of education and technical
training. As this trade-off between time in school and time in the labor market becomes
weaker over the working life of these children, the effects of parental unemployment start
to materialize. I investigate this explanation further in Section 7. In the next subsection,
I present additional results and investigate the robustness of my estimated effects.

6.2

Heterogeneous Results & Robustness

In this subsection, I provide heterogeneous results for interesting subgroups, mirroring
the estimates for educational attainment in Section 4. I also provide evidence of the
robustness of my estimates by showing that the labor market outcomes of children whose
parents had an unemployment spell around the age of starting school are not affected.

39

The outcome measured at ages 35 to 37 in my sample corresponds to the years 2010 to 2016. The average
real quarterly growth rate in the GDP during this time period was around 0.4%.
40
For example, Cockx and Ghirelli (2016) show that hourly wages of lower-educated individuals are hardly
affected by taking up employment in adverse conditions, but working time is. Although I do not have
hours worked in my data, my findings do not point toward this interpretation.
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First, I estimate the differential impact for children of two-parent households compared to children of single-parent households. Second, I estimate the effects for my
Extended Benefits sample. These parents can be regarded as highly productive and attached to the labor market. They may have better information and are better at guiding
their children in choosing a “safe field” of work later on (see Huttunen and Riukula, 2019).
If this is the case, one would expect to find lower estimates for this sample compared to
the results presented for the entire sample.
To gauge the robustness of my results, I also consider the long-run effects for children of parents displaced from their jobs at around the time of their children’s school
enrollment (age six) compared to earlier (age four). If my baseline results for children’s
long-term labor market outcomes are driven by unobserved components and not the
parental unemployment spell at an important educational milestone, then one would expect to find comparable patterns for this subgroup—that is, a flat impact at the lower
part of the income distribution and increasingly strong and negative effects at the upper part of the distribution. Notice, however, that the direction and magnitude of the
overall effect is not entirely clear a priori for this group. As parental investment is more
valuable at a younger age range (Del Bono et al., 2016), it might disproportionally affect
younger children when parents spend more time with their children as a response to the
unemployment spell. Likewise, there might also be negative long-term impacts if parents
decreased the time spent with their children when they were young as a response to the
unemployment spell.41
Figure 3 depicts the results for my three different subsamples. Looking at the results
for the two-parent sample presented in the first row, one can see that the estimates for
this subsample are remarkably similar to the ones obtained for my entire sample. The
confidence intervals are slightly wider, however. This is not surprising, as approximately
30% of the sample was excluded when I restricted the sample to children from two-parent
households. At ages 29–31, the estimated treatment effect is mainly concentrated around
zero along the income distribution, with wide confidence intervals. When children are
fairly established in the labor market at ages 35–37, however, I find a similar pattern
as before. The estimated effect at the lower part of the distribution is rather small and
not statistically significant, but it is large and increasing above the 60th percentile. The
estimated magnitude of the yearly loss is comparable to the estimates obtained using
the entire sample. Children in my treatment group around the 60th percentile earn
around 1,100 euros less, compared to 1,600 euros less for the full sample, and those at
the 80th percentile earn around 3,000 euros less, compared to 2,400 euros for the entire
sample. The estimates do not indicate that two-parent families are better in dealing with
unemployment at important milestones.
41

For brevity’s sake, I only report the initial and long-term estimates, and only for yearly income. The
complete set of estimates is available upon request.
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The second row in Figure 3 shows the results for my Extended Benefits sample.
As discussed in Section 4, unemployed parents in this sample are eligible for 30 weeks of
benefits rather than 20 weeks. This could give them more opportunities to look for better
reemployment options. With more such opportunities to look for better employment, the
effects of being unemployed could be muted; hence, these parents might be willing to
invest more in their children when they become unemployed.
However, the estimation results do not support this hypothesis. I find a similar
pattern along the income distribution for the restricted sample of parents who are eligible
for 30 weeks of benefits as I did for my entire sample. For the restricted sample, at the
beginning of a child’s labor market career there is no impact: effects are around zero over
most parts of the distribution. Later, when the child is well established, I find strong
negative effects in the upper part of the distribution. The estimated impact is remarkably
similar to the baseline estimates in both pattern and magnitude.
The last row in the Figure presents my estimation results for children whose parents were displaced around school enrollment age. Notice that in order to accommodate
the wider confidence intervals, the scale is different from that of the figures presented in
the previous panels. Children whose parents had an unemployment spell before enrollment at age four are now in the control group, and children with parents who had an
unemployment spell after school enrollment at age six constitute the treatment group.
Looking at the results for children whose parents experienced a spell of unemployment at the time they were enrolled in school, two features become apparent. First,
almost all of my estimated effects along the income distribution are not statistically significantly different from zero; this holds true for both early and long-term labor market
outcomes. Second, instead of a downward shift in the estimated effect when children were
more stable in the labor market, as was observed for my baseline results, these estimates
indicate that parental unemployment at enrollment age has a weakly positive (but not
significant) effect on long-term earnings. This might be the result of changes in early
childhood parental investment in the child. The results for this sample support my hypothesis that my main results are due to parental unemployment at times of important
educational decisions and not the result of parental unemployment per se.
[ Figure 3 ]
The results from my subsample analysis show that my main estimates are not driven
by children from two-parent households or by families with longer benefit eligibility. The
obtained quantile treatment effects are remarkably similar both in magnitude and shape
for my subpopulation analysis as those obtained for the entire sample. In addition, when
considering children whose parents had an unemployment spell before the important edu27

cational decision milestone, I do not find any effects on either short- or long-term income.
This is in line with the estimates for educational attainment discussed in Section 4.42

7

Decomposition of the Treatment Effect

In light of the discussion above, it is interesting to see how much of my total treatment
effect can be traced back to parents’ willingness to invest in their children, as embodied by
the educational tracking decision, and how much can be explained by other mechanisms.
Education is an important determinant of later labor market success, but parental unemployment can also indirectly affect other aspects in a child’s life—for example, through
divorce (Rege, Telle and Votruba, 2007; Eliason, 2012), health problems (Sullivan and
von Wachter, 2009; Eliason and Storie, 2009; Browning and Heinesen, 2012), and future fertility (Del Bono, Weber and Winter-Ebmer, 2012; Huttunen and Kellokumpu,
2016). Parental unemployment also could lead parents to encourage different amounts of
risk taking by their children or induce their children to select “safer” occupations (Choi,
Kariv, Müller and Silverman, 2014; Cole, Paulson and Shastry, 2014; Black, Devereux,
Lundborg and Majlesi, 2015; Huttunen and Riukula, 2019). To shed more light on the
connection between wages and lower parental investment due to unemployment at the
track choice, I decompose my treatment effect.

7.1

Decomposition of Quantile Treatment Effects

Before I present the results of my decomposition analysis, let me briefly discuss my
approach. Denote by E the educational attainment of the child—i.e., whether she has
obtained a university degree (E = 1) or not (E = 0). Define by E(t) the potential
educational achievement, and rewrite the potential outcome as a function of treatment
and potential education Y (t) = Y (t, E(t)). In order to evaluate the impact of forgone
education as a result of early parental displacement on my outcomes, I can decompose
∆(τ ) into two parts:
∆(τ ) =
=

Q1 (τ ) − Q0 (τ )
Q(1,E(1)) (τ ) − Q(1,E(0)) (τ )
{z
}
|

+

γ(τ ): Effect due to Changes in Educational Attainment

42

Despite my best efforts to account for selection into unemployment, as well as being able to include a
rich set of control variables and having a reassuring outcome from my robustness checks, there might
still be some concern about omitted variable bias. In the Appendix, I present estimates from a model
without including any control variables. The results are virtually identical to the ones presented here in
terms of magnitude and significance. This gives me reassurance that any remaining bias is likely small
in my analysis.
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Q(1,E(0)) (τ ) − Q(0,E(0)) (τ )
|
{z
}

(3)

θ(τ ):Residual Effect

At a given τ , γ(τ ) captures the effect of changes in educational attainment due to
unemployment at the important milestone compared to unemployment after the decision
has been made on the distribution of labor market outcomes. By holding the treatment
status constant and varying educational attainment of the child, it allows me to quantify
the importance of foregone education along the outcome distributions as a possible mechanism. If early displacement around the track choice indeed has long-term effects on the
labor force performance of children, γ(τ ) will be negative. θ(τ ) is the residual effect and
contains all other possible channels not captured by E.
It should be emphasized that the decomposition in Equation (3) only captures the
direct effect of educational attainment on future labor market outcomes. There are other
important determinants that are affected by parental job loss and education, such as taste
for risk taking, economic rationality, and occupational choice (Choi et al., 2014; Cole et al.,
2014; Black et al., 2015; Huttunen and Riukula, 2019). These channels are not captured
by my estimates of γ(τ ), but they are included in the residual effect. Therefore, it is likely
that my decomposition is underestimating the effect of foregone educational attainment
on future labor market outcomes.
Under a so-called sequential conditional independence assumption (SCIA), the decomposition in Equation (3) can be given a causal interpretation. The SCIA is stronger
than the unconfoundedness assumption imposed in the previous section and requires not
only that the treatment is (conditionally) independent of the potential outcomes and
attending university, but also that there is no selection into attending university with
respect to the outcome, once I control for treatment status and my observed covariates;
see, for example, Imai, Keele and Yamamoto (2010) for a discussion of this.43
There is strong support indicating that SCIA holds true in my analysis. First, exploiting the timing of unemployment rather than comparing employed to unemployed
parents minimizes the issue of selection. This can also be seen by the small differences in
background characteristics as reported in Table 1 and by the similar family income path
pre- and postunemployment between both groups, as shown in the previous section. Second, while the educational path of children is chosen shortly after the unemployment spell
in my treatment group, labor market outcomes are determined at least 10 years after this
point in time. Labor market outcomes thus cannot be perfectly foreseen either by parents
or children. Although parents might anticipate that there is a higher wage gain when
43

In addition, my estimation approach requires that θ is homogeneous in E. The decomposition in Equation (3) is commonly referred to as mediation analysis, and θ and γ are the direct and indirect effect,
respectively; see, for example, Huber, Lechner and Mellace (2016), Chen, Chen and Liu (2017), and
Schmidpeter (2018) for recent applications in economics.
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they choose the university track for their child, there is a certain level of uncertainty as to
how future outcomes will materialize. Furthermore, the statistics provided in Section 2
show that, although there is the possibility of reversing track choice later on, this is not
easy, and only a small share of children do so. In addition, I control for a wide variety
of characteristics that influence the selection into universities and employment, such as
parental education level. But even if my decomposition does not provide a complete and
causal description of pathways, it provides useful information about the scarring effects
parents’ unemployment can have on their children, and the potential for earnings inequality to be transmitted to future generations through adverse economic events experienced
by a child’s parents.
In order to estimate the missing counterfactual quantities in Equation (3), I first
0
obtain the residual effect θ(τ ) by estimating FY |X,U =u,T =t (y|t, Ui , Xi ) = Λ(Xi,T
=t β(y) +
α(y)Ei,T =t ) . This is done via logistic regressions separately for children in my treatment
and control groups, respectively. Notice that the difference from the econometric approach
outlined above is that the education dummy E is now included in the estimation. The
counterfactual quantity Fbt,E(t0 ) (y) for t, t0 ∈ {0, 1} is obtained by integrating over the
distribution of U and X, similarly as in Equation (2). These estimates are then inverted
b ), as defined in Equation (3). In order to obtain γ
b ) from
to obtain θ(τ
b(τ ), I subtract θ(τ
b ).
my previous estimates of ∆(τ

7.2

Decomposition Results

Figure 4 presents the results of my decomposition analysis. The solid line depicts the total
quantile treatment effect ∆(τ ), and the dashed line my estimates for θ(τ ). The shaded
region between both lines represents the estimates of γ(τ ). For expositional reasons, I
only report results for the 29–31 and 35–37 age ranges.
The first two rows in Figure 4 show the results of my decomposition for days of
employment and unemployment. My estimates for γ(τ ) at ages 29–31 indicate that for
children relatively loosely attached to the labor market, lower parental investment because
of unemployment at the track choice explains between 10 and 40% (or between 1 and 10
days) of the total treatment effect for employment days. For example, around the median,
the estimated total treatment effect is 12 days, out of which 4 days can explained directly
by lower parental investment. I come to a similar conclusion when looking at the effect
on unemployment days. There also is no strong evidence that the effects change over the
lifetime of the children.
The impact of lower parental investment as a result of parental unemployment at
the track choice becomes more pronounced when one looks at the decomposition results
for average yearly income, however, presented in the third row in Figure 4. The results
highlight again the largely heterogeneous impact of early parental job loss. During both
30

early career and later on, lower educational achievement as a response to early parental
unemployment has a negative impact on yearly income in the upper half of the distribution. The impact is, however, largely negligible below the median. As conjectured,
obtaining higher education is indeed more valuable at higher wage levels.
I also find that the negative consequences of lower parental investments intensify over
a child’s life cycle at the upper part of the income distribution. At ages 29–31, children in
my treatment group at the 60th percentile earn 190 euros less per year, and children at the
80th percentile earn 390 euros less per year, solely because of lower parental investment
at the track choice. My estimates for γ(τ ) increase to 350 euros at the 60th percentile
and to 900 euros at the 80th percentile four years later. These effects are quite sizable
and can explain up to 45% of the estimated total treatment effect.44
The findings in this section clarify why I do not find stronger total effects at the
early labor market stages; hence, they support my hypothesis. At the beginning, there is
a trade-off between experience and higher education. As higher education becomes relatively more valuable at later stages of the life cycle, the impact of suboptimal educational
decisions made by parents starts to materialize.
[ Figure 4 ]
As a robustness check, I decompose the estimated treatment effect for children in
cases for which parental unemployment occurred at the child’s school enrollment age.
If, instead of experiencing an unemployment spell at the time of important parental
educational decisions for their children, other factors are driving parents’ investment
decisions (and thus my decomposition results), one would expect to find similar effects
for γ(τ ) for the school enrollment age group too. For the sake of brevity, I only report
the decomposition results for yearly income in Figure 5 and only for the age ranges 29–31
and 35–37.45
From Figure 5 one can see that my estimates of ∆(τ ) and θ(τ ) are virtually identical along the income distribution for the school-enrollment-age group. Potential lower
educational achievement as a result of parental unemployment does not explain much in
the total estimated effect for this sample, and my estimates of γ(τ ) are very close to 0.
These results support my hypothesis that a substantial part of my long-run estimates
can be explained by suboptimal parental investment decisions around the schooling track
choice.
44

Remember that other important determinants of labor market success affected by education, such as the
quality of decision making and risk taking being consistent with economic rationality, are not captured
by my estimates of γ(τ ).
45
The decomposition of nonmonetary outcomes leads to similar conclusions; these conclusions are available
upon request.
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[ Figure 5 ]

8

Conclusion

In times of rising economic uncertainty, it is crucial to understand the intergenerational
transmission of parental unemployment. In this paper, I provide evidence that parents’
unemployment at the time of important parental educational decisions for their children
can have long-lasting and negative impacts on the children. Using administrative data for
Austria, and relying on the early track choice at age 10 inherent in the Austrian education
system to define such an important parental educational decision point, I compare longterm labor market outcomes of children whose parents had an unemployment spell shortly
before and after the track choice.
My estimates show that parental unemployment at an important decision milestone
compared to afterward leads to a 5 percentage point lower probability of obtaining a
university degree for affected children. I provide evidence that this difference cannot be
explained by different access to family resources. A more likely explanation is that shortterm constraints coupled with lower parental expectations about their future employment
possibilities affect the educational decisions. These lower employment expectations cause
parents to want to reduce their future financial responsibilities. Because students pursuing
university degrees are heavily dependent on financing from their parents, unemployed
parents’ desire to reduce future financial responsibilities may induce them to select a
lower educational track for their children.
The lower probability of obtaining a university degree can translate directly into
worse labor market outcomes—fewer days of employment, more days of unemployment,
and lower income. Investigating the impact of parental displacement at important educational decisions on these labor market outcomes, my results reveal substantial heterogeneity along the outcome distribution of interest and across children’s life cycles. For
example, I do not find any impact on yearly income at ages 29–31, a relatively early stage
in the child’s life cycle, but my results show that income gradually deteriorates afterward.
At ages 35–37, when children are well established in the labor market and effects are likely
to have a persistent impact on lifetime earnings, I estimate that parental unemployment
at important educational decisions lowers children’s yearly income by between 1,500 and
3,700 euros, or around 6 percentage points, at the upper part of the distribution. These
estimates imply at age 35 a net present value of lower future income of up to 65,000 euros.
Applying a decomposition, I find that 20% to 50% of these losses can be explained by
lower parental investment as a result of the unemployment spell at the educational decision milestone. In addition, I find a positive effect on days spent in unemployment and
show that this effect is largely concentrated among children prone to being unemployed.
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My results show that economic uncertainty occurring at important parental decision
points can negatively affect the prospects of the next generation. Affected children are
more susceptible to future economic shocks, and they have lower lifetime earnings. This
vulnerability to adverse economic shocks together with lower lifetime earnings may put
additional pressure on public finances and social support programs. The results of this
paper also show that the effects of adverse economic shocks on parents can be translated into greater earnings inequality in their children’s generation. This transmission of
adverse effects to unemployed individuals’ children has important implications for policymakers. While it is impossible to eliminate economic uncertainty, the results of this paper
show that it is important for policymakers to keep in mind when designing policies and
social security systems the large indirect costs for the next generation of unemployment
in the current generation. Policies can be designed to mute the transmission of these
effects across generations. For example, social security systems might be planned in such
a way that they take the life-cycle status of children into account.
A more direct implication of my findings is that the provision of financial support
or student loans for attending higher education might be able to mitigate the intergenerational effects of parental unemployment. This mitigation could occur if the financing
for obtaining university degrees took into account families’ past employment histories.
Although many countries have student loan systems in place, many of these systems take
into account only parents’ current earnings, and they often have parents serve as guarantors of the students’ loans. In several countries, including Austria, the typical student
loans are insufficient to cover students’ living expenses, and parents need to continue to
provide for their children while those children are enrolled in college. My results show
that parents needing to not only support their children while the children are enrolled
in college, but also potentially guarantee student loans, will cause them to choose less
expensive schooling tracks if these parents suffer an adverse economic shock at the time
of a crucial schooling decision for their children. If, however, parents knew that their
past employment histories would be taken into account when their children applied for
student loans, or if loans covered more of the students’ expenses, parents suffering adverse economic shocks might make different educational decisions earlier in the children’s
schooling. Without changes in the financing for attending university, the results of this
paper show that the negative effect of parents experiencing an adverse economic shock
will be transmitted to their children by lowering those children’s educational attainment,
decreasing their earnings, and increasing the instability of their employment.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status

Treatment
Control
Early Unemployment Late Unemployment
T =1
T =0
Main Earner
Personal Characteristics
Age at Birth (Years)
Female (%)
Single (%)
Non-Austrian (%)
No. of Children
University Degree (%)

27.94
29.59
30.88
5.10
1.81
3.81

28.05
33.21
35.76
5.36
1.74
4.73

Previous Labor Market Outcomes
Av. Log Income
9.93
Av. Employment (Days)
332.43

9.93
334.12

Raw
Difference

−0.11
−3.62∗∗
−4.88∗∗∗
−0.26
0.07∗∗∗
−0.91
−0.00
−1.69

Last Employed Sector (Shares)
Production
Construction
Commerce
Tourism
Traffic
Banking
Health
Other

27.01
17.84
18.56
4.54
3.97
6.03
4.48
17.58

29.44
14.69
19.09
3.38
3.51
6.45
5.24
18.20

−2.43
3.15∗∗
−0.54
1.15∗
0.46
−0.42
−0.75
−0.62

Spouse
Personal Characteristics
Age at Birth (Years)
Non-Austrian (%)
University Degree (%)

25.94
2.42
2.01

26.57
2.94
2.23

Previous Labor Market Outcomes
Spouse Employed (%)
Av. Log Income

−0.62∗∗
−0.51
−0.22

22.16
9.41

24.01
9.46

−1.85
−0.06

Children
Personal Characteristics
Female
University Degree (%)

48.36
24.83

47.31
30.67

Log Average Income at Age 35-37
Mean
10.00
10th Percentile
8.90
30th Percentile
9.77
50th Percentile
10.20
70th Percentile
10.47
90th Percentile
10.83

1.06
−5.84∗∗∗

10.03
8.94
9.77
10.23
10.54
10.90

−0.03
−0.04
−0.00
−0.03
−0.07∗∗∗
−0.07∗∗∗
6.39∗∗∗
2.67∗
2.22∗
2.57∗∗∗

Unemployment at Age 35-37
Mean
P(UE-Days ≥ 10)
P(UE-Days ≥ 30)
P(UE-Days ≥ 90)

29.51
25.70
20.69
11.46

23.12
23.03
18.47
8.89

No. of Children
No. of Families

2,078
1,940

1,689
1,566

*,**,*** indicate a significance difference at a 10%, 5% and 1% level.
The treatment group consists of all 10-year-old children and the control group consists of all 12-year-old children in families in which the main earner had an unemployment spell in the years 1987–1989. Parental log average income, employment,
and unemployment were measured using the five years preceding the reference date.
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Table 2: Effect of Early Displacement on Children’s Educational Achievement

Counterfactual Counterfactual Treatment Effect
E[E(1)]
E[E(0)]
E[E(1) − E(0)]
Total Sample

25.11
[23.24, 27.03]

29.99
[27.90,32.02]

−4.88
[-7.43,-2.29]

Two-Parent

27.88
[25.74, 30.18]

32.91
[30.26,35.45]

−5.03
[-8.20,-1.83]

Single

19.19
[16.21, 22.36]

23.68
[20.72,26.92]

−4.49
[-8.73,-0.20]

Extended Benefits

27.21
[25.16, 29.53]

31.96
[29.61,34.76]

−4.74
[-7.91,-1.70]

Lower Income

20.70
[18.07,23.40]

26.58
[23.24,29.65]

−5.87
[-9.65,-2.00]

Higher Income

47.19
[41.99, 52.20]

52.96
[47.95,58.12]

−5.77
[-12.46,0.01]

Around School Enrollment

23.36
[19.16, 28.23]

24.05
[22.19,25.96]

−0.69
[-5.04,4.48]

95% confidence intervals obtained from 999 bootstrap replications accounting
for clustering within families are reported in brackets. The outcome E is a
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the child holds a university degree. E[E(1)] and E[E(0)] are obtained by separate logistic regression in the
subpopulation with T = 1 (early unemployment) and T = 0 (late unemployment). The Total Sample consists of all 10-year-old children (treated) and
12-year-old children (control) born before September in families in which the
main earner had an unemployment spell in the years 1987–1989. The TwoParent sample includes only children of parents who specified a spouse when
applying for child benefits. Likewise, the Single sample includes only children
of parents who did not state a spouse when applying for child benefits, and
the Extended Benefits sample includes only children of parents in families in
which the main earner is eligible for at least 30 weeks of unemployment benefits instead of 20 weeks. An individual is eligible for the extension if, during
the three years preceding the current unemployment spell, he did not claim
benefits for more than 20 weeks and was employed for at least 152 weeks. The
Lower Income sample includes all children in families in which the average
income of the main earner three years prior to the unemployment spell is at
most 18,000 euros per year. Likewise, the Higher Income sample includes all
children in families in which the average wage of the main earner was at least
30,000 euros per year. The Around School Enrollment sample consist of all
six-year-old children (treated) and four-year-old children (control) born before
September in families in which the main earner had an unemployment spell
in the years 1981–1983.
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Figure 1: Effect of Unemployment on Parental Income
10.5
10.4
10.3
10.2
10.1

Log Yearly Income

10.0
9.9
9.8
9.7
9.6
9.5
9.4
9.3
9.2
9.1

Unemployment at Track Choice
Unemployment after Track Choice

9.0
−3

−2

−1

0

1

2

3

4

5

Years After Unemployment

a. Income of Main Earner
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b. Income of Family
E[ω(1)] is depicted by the solid line, E[ω(0)] by the dashed line. Estimates are obtained by
separate linear regression in the subpopulation with T = 1 (early unemployment) and T = 0
(late unemployment). Family Income is the sum of the income of the main earner and the
spouse. If the spouse did not work or there was no spouse present, spousal income was set to 0.
The shaded region corresponds to a 95% confidence interval. Note that confidence intervals for
E[ω(1)] and E[ω(0)] are overlapping.
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Figure 2: Treatment Effect of Parental Unemployment on Children’s Long-Term Outcomes
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The figure presents estimates of the treatment effect ∆(τ ) and quantile τ ∈ [.05, .95] together with 90%
confidence intervals. Outcomes are obtained by using a 3-years average of children’s yearly employment
and unemployment days as well as income at age 29-31, 32-34, and 35-37. The sample consists of all
children who were born before September, were 10 or 12 years old in 1987 -1989 and the main earner in the
family had an unemployment spell during this time. The treatment group (early displaced) consists of all
10 year old children, the control group of all 12 year old children. ∆(τ ) is obtained by inverting estimated
counterfactual distribution functions as outlined in Section 5. The treatment effect for employment days
and τ < .15 ∪ τ > .65 as well as for unemployment days and τ < .60 is always estimated to be 0 and
therefore not depicted in the figure. Inference is based on the Bayesian Bootstrap with 999 replications
taking clustering on the family level into account.
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The figure presents estimates of ∆(τ ) and τ ∈ [.05, .95] together with 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes
are obtained by using a 3-years average of children’s yearly income at age 29-31, 32-34, and 35-37. The
basline sample consists of all children who were born before September, were 10 or 12 years old in 1987
-1989 and the main earner in the family had an unemployment spell during this time. The Two-Parent
sample includes only children of parents from this sample who specified a spouse when applying for
child benefits. The Extended Benefits sample includes only children of parents where the main earner
is eligible for at least 30 weeks of unemployment benefits instead of 20 weeks. The Around School
Enrollment sample consist of all 6-years old children (treated) and 4-years old children (control) born
before September where the main earner had an unemployment spell in the years 1981 -1983. Notice,
in order to accommodate the wider confidence intervals obtained for this sample, the scale is different
to the previous figures. ∆(τ ) is obtained by inverting estimated counterfactual distribution functions as
outlined in Section 5. Inference is based on the Bayesian Bootstrap with 999 replications.
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The figure presents the results of the decomposition for the treatment effect ∆(τ ) and quantile τ ∈
[.05, .95] as outlined in Section 5. The total effect ∆(τ ) is depicted by the solid line, the direct effect θ(τ )
by the dashed line. The area between both lines corresponds to the indirect effect γ(τ ). The mediator
E is holding a university degree. Outcomes are obtained by using a 3-years average of children’s yearly
employment and unemployment days as well as income at ages 29-31 and 35-37. The sample consists
of all children who were born before September, were 10 or 12 years old in 1987–1989, and the main
earner in the family had an unemployment spell during this time. The treatment group (early displaced)
consists of all 10-year-old children; the control group of all 12-year-old children.
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The figure presents the results of the decomposition of the treatment effect ∆(τ ) and quantile τ ∈ [.05, .95]
as outlined in Section 5. The total effect ∆(τ ) is depicted by the solid line; the direct effect θ(τ ) by
the dashed line. The area between both lines corresponds to the indirect effect γ(τ ). The mediator
E is holding a university degree. Outcomes are obtained by using a three-year average of children’s
yearly employment and unemployment days as well as income at ages 29–31 and 35–37. The sample
consists of all children who were born before September, were four or six years old in 1981–1983, and
were in families in which the main earner in the family had an unemployment spell during this time.
The treatment group consists of all six-year-old children, the control group of all four-year-old children.
Notice: ∆(τ ) and γ(τ ) are virtually identical for this sample and therefore hard to distinguish in the
graph.
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https://www.statistik.at/
web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bildung/hochschulen/
studienabschluesse/index.html. (Online; accessed 08-September-2019).
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A
A.1

Additional Results
Extended Treatment and Control Group

This section presents the main results with an extended control group. Children whose
parents had an unemployment spell when the children were 9 or 10 now constitute the
treatment group, and children with unemployed parents at age 11 or 12 are now in the
control group. As in the main analysis, three-year means of the respective variables
of interest are taken as outcomes. The estimation procedure follows the same steps as
described in Section 5 with 999 bootstrap replications. The results are presented in
Figure A.1.
As one can see, extending the control groups does not alter the conclusion arrived at
in the paper. However, the results tend to be smaller in magnitude. For example, at the
90th percentile of the wage distribution, the estimated income loss amounts to around
2,200 euros, compared to 3,000 euros as reported in Section 6. Also, the impact on
employment and unemployment days decreases somewhat. Nevertheless, the estimated
effects are still sizable, especially for my proxy of lifetime income.

1

A.2

Different Age Ranges for Outcomes

In this section, I present results for two-year instead of three-year averages for my outcomes. The treatment and control groups consist of all children whose parents got displaced when the children were aged 10 and 12, respectively, as described in Section 3.
Figure A.2 presents the estimated effect.
Using a shorter time horizon over which I define the outcome does not change the
results. Children of parents who were unemployed before the schooling choice have more
unemployment days and lower wages in the long run. The results presented in the Figure A.2 also highlight the deterioration in labor market outcomes with elapsed time. As
one can see, unemployment days are consequently increasing while wages are falling at
the upper part of the distribution.

A.3

Less Restrictive Sample

The results reported in Section 6 are based on parents with strong attachment to the labor
market. In this section, I consider the case when imposing less restrictive assumptions
on employment. Instead of requiring at least 360 days of employment before the current
unemployment spell, I now include individuals with at least 180 days of employment.
Individuals in this sample are still entitled to benefits payments, but with considerably
shorter duration on average. Furthermore, it is likely that unobservable characteristics
play a more important role here. Figure A.3 presents the results.
From the figure, one can see that the results for employment and unemployment
days are very similar to those obtained for the more restrictive sample. The effect on
long-term wages for this sample is, however, substantially larger. At the upper half of the
distribution, the effects at the ages of 35–37 are higher compared to the ones reported in
the main text. My conclusion, however, remains valid even when using a less restrictive
sample criterion.

2

A.4

Outcomes at Younger Ages

In Section 6, I argue that my first set of results, obtained at ages 29–31, reflects the
impact on the early labor market career of the children, especially for those graduating
from university. The lower bound at age 29 is motivated by the fact that a relatively low
share of individuals who finally graduate from university have a very strong labor force
attachment before that age, but it is also chosen somewhat arbitrarily. In this section, I
show that my discussions and conclusions in the main text remain valid when considering
labor market outcomes before that threshold. The results for the impact on yearly income
at ages 20–22, 23–25, and 26–28 can be found in Figure A.4.
My results point toward evidence that parental unemployment at an important
decision milestone actually increases yearly income when the child is younger, in line
with the findings of Fradkin et al. (2019). This is especially true when we look at the
effect on income at ages 20–22, a time in which most of the estimated treatment effects
are, significantly, estimates. This is likely because individuals who attend universities
only have looser labor market attachment at that period of life and do not pursue fulltime work. As individuals become more likely to graduate from university and transition
into full-time work, the effect starts to decrease, and my estimates become more noisy
with wider confidence intervals—particularly in the upper half of the distribution. The
results show that even before the age of 29, one can observe a gradual decline in the labor
market outcomes of children in my treatment group.

3

A.5

Estimates Not Including Control Variables

Despite my best efforts to account for possible selection in my sample and the robustness
checks presented in the main part of the paper, there still might be some remaining
concern that my results are affected by omitted variable bias. There might also be a
concern that my approach does not fully capture potential cohort heterogeneity. Hilger
(2016) and Fradkin et al. (2019) discuss under what conditions year-of-layoff and cohort
heterogeneity can bias estimates of parental job loss, and propose a linear type of doubledifference approach to account for it. As I look at the impact of parental unemployment
on the distribution of outcomes, I cannot follow their advice.
I investigate the sensitivity of my results to possible omitted variable bias by reestimating my model without including any control variables. If the results did substantially
differ from those presented in Section 6 in the main text, this would give rise to concerns
about omitted variable bias in my estimates.
Figure A.5 presents the results when no control variables are included in the estimation. I find the same pattern as reported in the main text for all the outcomes.
Reassuringly, even when not including any covariates in the estimation, my results are
very similar in both magnitude and significance to the ones from my richer model with
a full set of control variables; see Figure 2) in the main text. For example, parental
unemployment has no impact on children’s income at the beginning of their labor market
careers. Once children are established in the labor market and higher education becomes
more important, I find strong and negative impacts in the upper part of the income distribution. Given these results, I am therefore confident that any type of remaining bias
is likely small in magnitude in my analysis.
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Figure A.1: Treatment Effect of Parental Unemployment on Children’s Long-Term Outcomes - Extended Treatment & Control Group
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The figure presents estimates of the treatment effect ∆(τ ) and quantile τ ∈ [.05, .95] together with
90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are obtained by using a three-year average of children’s yearly
employment and unemployment days as well as income at ages 30–31, 32–33, 34–35, and 36–37. The
same sample consists of all children who were between 9 and 12 years old at the time of parental
unemployment. Children aged 9–10 are in the treatment group; children aged 11–12 are in the control
group. ∆(τ ) is obtained by applying the method in Section 5. Inference is based on the Bayesian
Bootstrap with 999 replications, taking into account clustering on the family level.
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The figure presents estimates of the treatment effect ∆(τ ) and quantile τ ∈ [.05, .95] together with 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are obtained by using
a two-year average of children’s yearly employment and unemployment days as well as income at ages 30–31, 32–33, 34–35, and 36–37. The same sample is
described in Section 3. ∆(τ ) is obtained by applying the method in Section 5. Inference is based on the Bayesian Bootstrap with 999 replications, taking into
account clustering on the family level.
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Figure A.2: Treatment Effect of Parental Unemployment on Children’s Long-Term Outcomes—Two-Year Averages
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Figure A.3: Treatment Effect of Early Parental Unemployment on Children’s Long-Term
Outcomes - Less Restrictive Selection
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The figure presents estimates of the treatment effect ∆(τ ) and quantile τ ∈ [.05, .95] together with
90% confidence intervals. Outcomes are obtained by using a three-year average of children’s yearly
employment and unemployment days, as well as income at ages 29–31, 32–34, and 35–37. The sample
consists of all children who were born before September and were 10 or 12 years old in 1987–1989, during
a time when the main earner in the family had an unemployment spell. Parents with labor market
experience of less than 180 days preceding the unemployment spell are excluded. The treatment group
(early displaced) consists of all 10-year-old children; the control group of all 12-year-old children. ∆(τ ) is
obtained by inverting estimated counterfactual distribution functions as outlined in Section 5. Inference
is based on the Bayesian Bootstrap, with 999 replications taking into account clustering on the family
level.
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The figure presents estimates of the treatment effect ∆(τ ) for average yearly income and quantile τ ∈ [.05, .95] together with 90% confidence intervals. Outcomes
are obtained by using a three-year average of children’s yearly employment and unemployment days as well as income at ages 20–22, 23–25, and 26–28. The
sample consists of all children who were born before September and were 10 or 12 years old in 1987 –1989, a time when the main earner in the family had an
unemployment spell. The treatment group (early displaced) consists of all 10-year-old children; the control group of all 12-year-old children. ∆(τ ) is obtained
by inverting estimated counterfactual distribution functions as outlined in Section 5. Inference is based on the Bayesian Bootstrap with 999 replications, taking
into account clustering on the family level.
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Figure A.4: Treatment Effect of Parental Unemployment on Children’s Income at Ages 20-28
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Figure A.5: Treatment Effect of Parental Unemployment on Children’s Income without
Additional Covariates
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The figure presents estimates of the treatment effect ∆(τ ) for average yearly income and quantile τ ∈
[.05, .95] together with 90% confidence intervals any additional covariates. Outcomes are obtained by
using a three-year average of children’s yearly employment and unemployment days as well as income at
ages 29–31, 32–34, and 35–37. The sample consists of all children who were born before September and
were 10 or 12 years old in 1987–1989, a time when the main earner in the family had an unemployment
spell. The treatment group (early displaced) consists of all 10-year-old children; the control group of all
12-year-old children. ∆(τ ) is obtained by inverting estimated counterfactual distribution functions as
outlined in Section 5. Inference is based on the Bayesian Bootstrap with 999 replications, taking into
account clustering on the family level.
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B

Children’s Educational Achievement and Parents’
Predicted Labor Market Outcomes

In this section, I explore the hypothesis that the timing of the adverse income shock
coupled with lower expectations of future labor market outcomes leads parents to invest
less in their children. The analysis proceeds as follows: First, I predict either a) the
probability that the main earner attains the preunemployment income level or b) the
average postunemployment income within five years after the unemployment spell.1 To
avoid overfitting, I follow the method suggested by Abadie et al. (2018) in this step.
Second, I split my sample into two groups of parents with above and below median
probabilities of recovery or above and below median predicted income. Lastly, for each
of these two groups I estimate the impact of parental unemployment shortly before the
important educational investment decision for their children on a child’s probability of
holding a university degree. I also estimate the effect on children’s educational attainment
following similar steps using my sample of parents with an unemployment spell around
the time of their child’s school enrollment. The results are summarized in Table B.1.
The results in Table B.1 show that the effects discussed in Section 4 in the main
part of the paper are mainly driven by children of parents who had an unemployment
at the important education decision and a low probability of recovering from the income
shock. For this group, I estimate a treatment effect of 8 percentage points. In comparison, I do not find any statistical different impact of parental unemployment around the
track choice on parent’s educational investment decision for the parents with high likelihood of recovering from the income loss. Using predicted income instead of recovering
probabilities produces similar estimates.
In the last row of Table B.1 I also present results for the educational attainment
of children whose parents experienced an unemployment spell around school enrollment.
There is not evidence that parents adjust their investment into their children when experiencing an unemployment spell around school enrollment age. The estimates for both
the high and low likelihood group are rather small. These findings are in line with the
results reported in Section 4.
In sum, the results presented here confirm my hypothesis that lower parental investment is caused by the timing of the income shock coupled with lower expectations about
future labor market outcomes.

1

The results are virtually identical when including spouses’ income into the prediction of the probabilities.
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−1.47
[-8.26,6.76]

−1.51
[-6.66,5.22]

0.11
[-6.04,8.52]

−7.66
[-11.36, -4.00]

−1.16
[-4.46,2.11]

−8.74
[-12.75, -4.74]
−0.44
[-5.61,6.55]

−1.59
[-4.92,1.88]

95% confidence intervals obtained from 999 bootstrap replications accounting for clustering within families are
reported in brackets. Parents are divided into two groups as a function of either a) their predicted probability of
reaching preunemployment income within five years after the unemployment spell or b) their average predicted
post-unemployment income over the five years after the unemployment spell. To avoid overfitting, the method
of Abadie et al. (2018) is used when making the prediction. The outcome E is a dummy variable which takes a
value of 1 if the child holds a university degree. The treatment effects are obtained by separate logistic regression
in the subpopulation with T = 1 (early unemployment) and T = 0 (late unemployment) seperately for parents in
the high and low group .The Total Sample consists of all 10-year-old children (treated) and 12-year-old children
(control) born before September in families in which the main earner had an unemployment spell in the years
1987–1989. The Around School Enrollment sample consist of all six-year-old children (treated) and four-yearold children (control) born before September in families in which the main earner had an unemployment spell
in the years 1981–1983.

Around School Enrollment

Total Sample

Low Predicted
Income

High Predicted
Likelihood

Low Predicted
Likelihood

High Predicted
Income

Average Postunemployment Income

Reaching Preunemployment Income Levels

Table B.1: Children’s Educational Achievement by Parents’ Predicted Labor Market Outcomes
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